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THE POSITION OF THE FREIGHT CARRIERS BEFORE
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
STEPHEN ALEs*
Who should be in the air freight business, and what are the proper rules of the
game? These two questions state the central issues in a battle that has been waged
before the Civil Aeronautics Board since the spring of 1946. The contestants on
one side have been the certificated passenger air lines,' their trade association,2 and
their wholly owned cargo ground service subsidiary? The carriers in this group,
for convenience and because the term describes their principal business,4 will here-
after be referred to as the "passenger carriers." The contestants on the other side
have been a group of new companies, organized after the cessation of hostilities in
the last war, who have devoted almost all of their energies to the development of
commercial air freight. For convenience, and again because the term describes
their principal business,5 these carriers will be referred to as the "freight carriers."
The battle before the CAB has been long and bitter, and it is still going on.
That it has been long will be apparent from a glance at the proceedings involved.
The Air Freight case,' in which the issue of certification of freight carriers was
directly posed, alone has required 65 days of hearings, some 30,000 pages of testi-
mony and exhibits, briefs before examiners, a full year's study by the examiners, a
lengthy examiner's report, briefs before the Board, oral argument before the Board,
a reopened hearing in order to obtain some additional evidence, a second oral argu-
ment before the Board, a tentative decision by the Board, exceptions thereto, new
briefs, still another argument before the Board, and at long last, a final decision, on
August 2, 1949, on applications most of which were filed in the spring of 1946.
Other proceedings have included the Air Freight Rate case 7in which the freight
carriers sought and received from the Board a minimum rate order' halting the
* A.B. 1933, Princeton University; LL.B. 1936, West Virginia University; member of West Virginia
and District of Columbia bars.1 Principally American Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Transcon-
tinental and Western Air, Inc., Capital Airlines, Inc., Braniff Airways, Inc., and Chicago and Southern
Air Lines, Inc.
aThe Air Transport Association.
'Air Cargo, Inc.
'Even as late as 1948, passenger traffic accounted for 91.6 per cent of the non-mail revenue of the
then certificated trunk line carriers, according to Roadcap, Airline Record 1949. Freight revenues re-
ported to the CAB at slightly over ii million dollars accounted for slightly more than 3 per cent of
this revenue.
"Most of the applicants in the Air Freight case have been "freight only" carriers. They have never
been permitted to carry air express and have not sought the right to carry air mail or passengers. Some
of these companies have had outside sources of revenue from overhaul, maintenance, and modification
work, or leasing of aircraft.
0 CAB Docket No. 81o.
7 CAB Docket No. 1705.
' CAB Order, Serial No. E-i639, issued June 2, 1948.
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passenger carriers' attempts to decide question number one (who should be in the
air freight business) by means of a rate war. Since the rate case, we have had four
modifying orders9 and a lengthy hearing on the subject of whether less-than-minimum
backhaul rates may continue to be employed.'" In addition, the freight carriers,
for reasons which will be apparent later on, have intervened in mail rate proceed-
ings1 in support of their belief that the sound development of air freight requires
a firm decision that mail subsidy will not be used to underwrite freight operations
of the passenger carriers.
That this fight has been bitter is understandable. The freight carriers, with all
the energy and enthusiasm of the pioneer, have been prepared to fight for the privi-
lege of going forward with a business which they feel they have started. The
passenger carriers, on the other hand, never distinguished for their hospitality to-
ward newcomers to the aviation field, 2 have been particularly resentful of the
newly arrived freight carriers, described in a recent Board document as among the
"have nots" of aviation.'3
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, with its subsidy provision,' 4 has meant, so
far at least, that any carrier once engaged in commercial air transportation is there
for good, and need have no fear of bankruptcy or failure.'9 As a result, the pas-
senger carriers have viewed with real alarm the prospective permanent dilution of
their claim on the United States Treasury when any new carrier has sought admis-
sion to the club. They have viewed with even more alarm the arrival of freight
' These orders have added temporary less-than-minimum backhaul rates for certain commodities.
" This investigation, generally referred to as the Directional Rate Investigation, was addressed to
the question of whether these temporary backhaul rates should be continued and whether additional
ones should be added.
" Principally the Big Four Mail Pay case, CAB, Docket No. 2849, the Big Four Financial Inves.
tigation, CAB, Docket No. 3663, and Mail Cost Investigation of All Trunk Lines, CAB, Docket No.
3666.
2 Examples of their vigorous opposition to other potential entrants into the aviation field may be
found in the Feeder cases dealing with the certification of small feeder airlines, the Freight Forwarder
case in which freight forwarders sought to engage in "indirect" air transportation, and the "Sea-Air"
fight, the common name for the controversy over whether or not steamship lines or other surface car-
riers could own or operate airlines. In fact, even the Railway Express Agency, responsible for almost
all of the passenger carriers' pre-1945 property transportation, was told in the course of the Freight
Forwarder case that there would be no place for REA in aviation once the passenger carriers had Air
Cargo, Inc., in full operation. CAB citations for these matters are as follows:
Local Feeder and Pick-Up Air Service, 6 CAB a (1944) and subsequent regional cases; the Freight
Forwarder case, CAB, Docket No. 681; American President Lines, Ltd., et al., Petition 7 CAB 799
(947) and subsequent separate carrier cases. For REA disavowal see Examiner's Report in the Freight
Forwarder case (Docket No. 687), pp. 76-77.
"See Respondent's Objections to Petition for a Stay, filed August 11, 1949, by the CAB in the
pending case of American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, No. 10374, United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
" "In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation [for the carriage of mail]
. . . the Board shall take into consideration . . . the need of each such air carrier for compensation for
the transportation of mail sufficient . . . together with all other revenue . . . to enable such carrier
under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air
transportation .. " Sec. 406(b), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 998 (1938), 49 U. S. C.
§486(b) (1946).
" This statement must be qualified to the extent that the Board has taken steps toward the revoca-
tion of two feeder line certificates.
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carriers who insist that they can operate without direct government subsidy of any
kind, because these carriers, with that threat, in effect throw doubt on the need for
continuation of government subsidy for the passenger carriers at all.
Issue number one, "Who should be in the air freight business," has been decided,
at least in so far as the administrative process is concerned. The case was called the
Air Freight case, Docket 8io et al. That case was a proceeding to review and rule
upon applications filed by thirteen freight carriers for certificates of convenience and
necessity. In that proceeding (aside from questions of fitness and ability of indi-
vidual carriers which are beyond the scope of this paper) the position of the freight
carriers may be stated as follows:
(i) The public interest requires that air freight service expand and grow until
it becomes a major component of the nation's air transportation system.
(2) It is in the public interest that such an air freight service be developed
efficiently, soundly, and rapidly.
(3) Freight carriers carrying nothing but freight will aid substantially in this
development.
(4) The presence of freight carriers will work no injury on previously certifi-
cated passenger carriers; much less will any such injury offset the benefit to
be gained.
The first two propositions have not been the subject of great debate. Most every
observer realizes that the large fleet of all-cargo aircraft, immediately convertible to
wartime use,"0 which a fully developed air freight system would require, would be
a tremendous asset to the nation in the event of war. Furthermore, almost everyone
agrees that a fully developed air freight industry would be a substantial aid to the
functioning of the nation's economy and the lowering of costs and increasing of
speed of distribution in time of peace.'7
The argument has centered around the third and fourth of the propositions
stated above. As to the third, it has been the position of the freight carriers that
single-purpose companies, who must look to air freight and air freight profits as
their principal source of income, will have an incentive to go forward with the
business, to search for new traffic, and to seek new methods of improving efficiency,
which a multi-purpose carrier would not have. This, incidentally, is a theory which
" A passenger plane with its plush interior and fixed seating arrangement must be altered sub-
stantially before it is of value for military transport use. Not only must the seats and plush lining be
removed, but the floor must be strengthened and a tie down arrangement installed. When this is
done, the passenger plane is only as ready for military use as is the freight plane in the first instance.
If real cooperation on plane requirements between the air force and companies engaged in air freight
service can be achieved, then the air freight fleet can be a military air transport fleet in being in the
event of war.
17 See the statement of the Secretary of Commerce before the President's Air Policy Commission
on November 26, 1947, speaking by analogy of the effects of the improved railroad service after World
War I, "The most important factor, however, was the reduction in inventories which was made possible
by the improved services, in addition to the capital savings ultimately resulting in lower prices; the
reduced need for large and relatively idle inventories increases the stability of our economy."
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has the whole-hearted support of the passenger carriers when they attempt to fight
off the threatened invasion of the aviation field by steamship lines and railroad
companies? 9
Furthermore, the freight carriers contend that since they have not sought gov-
ernment subsidy, and will not receive it, but must be dependent on freight revenues
and profits if they are to be successful, it follows that they have an incentive to keep
costs down which no other air carrier has, or could have, and the lowering of costs
for air freight is an absolute sine qua non to the development of the business, since
low rates depend on low costs, and without low rates no major increases in volume
can be achieved.
In support of these propositions, the freight carriers point to the record of what
has happened in air freight so far, and the part which they have played in it. Prior
to 1945 the volume of air freight which had been carried was so small that it was
not even reported separately to the Civil Aeronautics Board. In 1945 the total
amount of air freight reported was 1,227,527 ton-miles20 The smallness of this
figure can be understood when it is realized that one plane with a capacity of but
io,ooo pounds hauls i2,2oo ton-miles of air freight on one trip from New York to
Los Angeles. As of January i, 1946, only American Airlines and TWA had freight
tariffs on file. American's tariff had been filed in October, 1944, and listed rates
averaging around 35 cents a ton-mile and going as high as 50 cents, rates which
negative any desire or intent to engage in a volume air freight business.
Early in 1946 the picture changed markedly. A substantial group of new com-
panies was formed, largely by young men anxious to apply the material hauling and
handling techniques and methods developed by the Air Transport Command and
the Naval Air Transport Service to commercial transportation. All of these com-
panies were long on enthusiasm, and some were adequately financed. The founders
of these companies were convinced that air freight costs could be reduced low enough
to permit rates which in turn would attract air freight business in volume. Ameri-
can Airlines' figure of 35 cents was demonstrably much too high.
Slick Airways started in business in March of 1946 with rates at i8 cents a ton-
mile, and was shortly enabled to reduce them to 14 cents as costs per ton-mile
declined with volume. With the establishment of these rates commercial air freight
was born.
By the end of 1946, ten freight carrier applicants in the Air Freight case, oper-
ating at the time as contract carriers, had hauled an estimated 27,000,000 ton-miles
"In that controversy, the fact that they are engaged in air transportation alone is urged as the
reason why they are better able to go forward with the business than any surface carrier would be.
"Air transportation is not an adjunct to anything; it is a new business selling a new product and the
responsibility for the solution of its problems must be given to those whose sole interest lies in develop-
ing it. The United States air transportation cannot reach its full potentiality in the hands of those who
regard it as a part-time job." (Statement of Robert Ramspeck, Executive Vice-President, Air Transport
Association, hearings on bills relative to overseas air transportation, pp. ioi8-ig.) The freight carriers
say that the same thing is true about air freight.2oReports to CAB.
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of freight. Of this total, Slick Airways had hauled II,I98,32221 ton-miles, or over
nine times the total passenger carrier haul reported for the preceding year, 1945.
This demonstration of the possibilities inherent in the transportation of freight by
air did not go unnoticed by the passenger carriers. In 1946, twelve passenger car-
riers carried 13,969,X27 ton-miles of air freight in domestic operations. 2 No one
seriously contends that the passenger carriers would have hauled more than this
amount had no new freight carriers come into the field. Actually, most observers
agree with an expert from the Department of Agriculture, who testified in the Air
Freight case as follows :23
It is my opinion that these carriers (the freight carriers) have had a profound effect
on the development of air freight. I am convinced that, if these specialized air freight
carriers had not been in existence during the past year or more, the reduction in air freight
rates which has occurred would have been much less, the volume of air freight handled
would have been of minor proportions, and we would not have explored air cargo poten-
tials to nearly the extent which has been done.
The year 1947 saw a continuation of the phenomenal growth of air freight.
Freight carriers carried 45,299,885 ton-miles of air freight, and sixteen passenger car-
riers carried 38,87o,698 ton-miles.2 4 This total of nearly 84,00oooo represents a phe-
nomenal increase over the i,ooo,ooo figure of two years before. Slick Airways again
was in the van with a total of 21,937,083 ton-miles.25
The year 1948 saw the freight industry grow to the imposing figure of ii6,ooo,ooo
ton-miles. Of this total, the passenger carriers carried some 70,000,00o, and the
freight carriers carried approximately 46,000,00o.26 The decline in the share of the
freight carriers is accounted for largely by a reduction in the number of companies
still participating in the business.27 The regulatory process had taken a long time
and a sharp application of economic sanctions by the passenger carriers had taken
its toll. The leader in the field, however, still was Slick Airways with 26,581,718
ton-miles hauled in 1948 as against 21,818,133 ton-miles for American Airlines.28
The freight carriers also contend that the fourth proposition-namely, that the
certification of freight carriers would work no substantial injury to the passenger
carriers-is largely answered by this record in air freight. The record demonstrates
that the freight carriers' presence in the business has actually increased the amount
of freight which the passenger carriers have carried and, further, that those pas-
senger carriers who have had the most competition from freight carriers have carried
the most freight. Besides, the freight carriers contend, even if the passenger carriers
were to lose freight business to the freight carriers, it is not clear that such losses
' Reported by Slick Airways, Inc., to CAB.
"Reports to CAB.
2A 4ir Freight case, Docket 8io, Transcript 40o8-4oo9.
"Final opinion the Air Freight case, Docket 81o et al., decided July 29, 1949, p. io.
= Slick Airways, Inc., reports to CAB.
2 See note 24, supra.
27 Only three or four freight carriers were active throughout 1948.
" Reports of both companies to the CAB.
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would cause financial injury. As is pointed out hereafter, it is doubtful that the
freight business can be so coordinated with the passenger business, as presently
operated, as to make the freight business profitable to the passenger carriers.
On August 2, 1948, certificates of convenience and necessity for transcontinental
routes were awarded to two air lines, Slick Airways, Inc.,29 and the Flying Tiger
Line,30 and a north-south certificate, covering a route from Florida and Louisiana
to New York and the midwest, was awarded to United States Airlines0 1 In addi-
tion, Airnews received a certificate calling for local operations in southern Texas 2
In the course of the opinion accompanying this decision the Board found:"
* The certification of unsubsidized all-cargo carriers requires such carriers to bend their
efforts and to direct their abilities and skill to the full development of the air freight
potential. Such carriers will not be able to rely on passenger operations or mail pay-
ments to furnish the greater portion of their revenues. They will live and prosper only
"' Slick Airways, Inc., authorized to engage in air transportation with respect to property, for a period
of five years, between any point or points in any of the following groups of points and any point or
points in any other of said groups: the terminal point Los Angeles, the intermediate points, Bakersfield,
Brawley-E Centro, Fresno, Long Beach, Oakland, Sacramento, Salinas-Monterey, San Diego, San Fran-
cisco, Santa Barbara, Stockton, and Thermal; the intermediate point Phoenix; the intermediate points
Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Eagle Pass, Fort Worth-Dallas, Houston, Laredo, Mission, and San Antonio;
the intermediate point Kansas City; the intermediate points Akron, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Fort Wayne, Indianapolis, Louisville, Peoria, St. Louis, South Bend, and
Toledo; the intermediate points Allentown, Baltimore, Boston, Harrisburg, Hartford, New York, New-
ark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Providence, Washington, Richmond, and Wilmington; the intermediate
point Rockland; and the terminal point Portland.
'o The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., authorized to engage in air transportation with respect to property,
for a period of five years, between any point or points in any of the following groups of points and any
point or points in any other of said groups: the terminal point Los Angeles, the intermediate points Bakers-
field, Brawley-El Centro, Fresno, Long Beach, Oakland, Sacramento, Salinas-Monterey, San Diego, San
Francisco, Santa Barbara, Stockton, and Thermal; the intermediate points Longvicw, Portland, Seattle,
Wenatchee, and Yakima; the intermediate point Minneapolis-St. Paul; the intermediate point Denver; the
intermediate points Des Moines and Omaha; the intermediate points Akron, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit,
Fort Wayne, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, South Bend, and Toledo; the intermediate points Albany, Bing-
hamton, Boston, Buffalo, Hartford, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Providence, and Rochester; the
intermediate point Rockland; and the terminal point Portland.
" U. S. Airlines, Inc., authorized to engage in air transportation with respect to property, for a
period of five years, (t) between any point or points in any of the following groups of points and any
point or points in any other of said groups: the terminal point Miami, intermediate points Atlanta,
Belle Glade, Fort Myers, Jacksonville, Lakeland, Ocala, Orlando, Sarasota-Bradenton, Birmingham, Savan-
nah, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Valdosta, and West Palm Beach; the intermediate points Baton Rouge,
Gulfport-Biloxi, Hammond, Mobile, Morgan City, and New Orleans; the intermediate points Akron,
Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Indianapolis, Louisville, Mil-
waukee, South Bend, and Toledo; and the terminal point Minneapolis-St. Paul; and (2) between any
point or points in any of the following groups of points and any point or points in any other of said
groups: the terminal point Miami, intermediate points Atlanta, Belle Glade, Fort Myers, Jacksonville,
Lakeland, Ocala, Orlando, Sarasota-Bradenton, Birmingham, Savannah, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Valdosta,
and West Palm Beach; the intermediate points Baton Rouge, Gulfport-Biloxi, Hammond, Mobile, Morgan
City and New Orleans; the intermediate points Albany, Allentown, Baltimore, Binghamton, Boston,
Buffalo, Harrisburg, Hartford, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Providence, Rochester, Washington,
Richmond, and Wilmington; and the terminal point New York.
" Airnews, Inc., authorized to engage in air transportation with respect to property, for a period
of five years, between the terminal point San Antonio, the intermediate point Beeville, and the terminal
point Corpus Christi; and between the terminal point San Antonio, the intermediate points MeAllen
and Harlingen, and the terminal point Brownsville, subject to condition.
" Final opinion the Air Freight case, Docket No. 81o, decided July 29, 1949, pp. 30-31.
POSITION OF THE FREIGHT CARRIERS BEFORE H CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD 23
through their ability to develop an economic business and by constant search for new
techniques, new business, and new equipment. To the extent that they succeed in such
endeavors, they will, by their example, benefit the presently certificated carriers and air
transportation as a whole.
The decision in the Air Freight case brings to a conclusion the administrative
phase of the process by which the question, "Who should be in the air freight busi-
ness," is to be determined. The passenger carriers, however, have not been content to
rely on the judgment of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and subsequent reviewing
courts, in their effort to obtain a decision which reserves the field solely to them.
They have undertaken by competitive means to drive all prospective applicants from
the air freight field, and these efforts have met with an unfortunate degree of suc-
cess.3 4 It is this last campaign which has given rise to the second issue, "What are
proper rules of the game," an issue which is still before the Board and before Con-
gress as well.
To see the competitive picture in its true light, one must remember that the
passenger carriers have not ordinarily been advocates of a low-rate-high-volume
approach to air transportation. For instance, passenger rates per ton-mile have
stayed in the neighborhood of 55 cents to 6o cents for some time and, with the ex-
ception of Capital Airlines, the passenger carriers are still either opposed33 or were
somewhat reluctant and recent converts to the low rate coach service type of busi-
ness, 30 where rates are in the neighborhood of 40 cents a ton-mile. The public pays
an average rate of 61 cents a ton-mile for air express, and the Railway Express Agency
has been completely unsuccessful in its efforts over the last several years to obtain
the passenger carriers' consent which, under the contract, is a prerequisite to a rate
reduction3 7  The so-called "service" rate for the carriage of mail for the major
passenger airlines which are not in the "need" class38 runs in the neighborhood of
6o cents a ton-mile3 9 Air parcel post rates under an act sponsored by the passenger
carriers are paid 6o cents and up a ton-mile for carrying it.4°
" The gory details may be found in the dissenting opinion of Member Jones in the Air Freight case,
Docket No. 81o, et al. Member Jones does not discuss the part the passenger carriers played in bringing
about these losses.
"' Some, such as United Air Lines, Inc., as of October, 1949, still did not believe in the coach
business.
" Eastern Air Lines, Inc., instituted its first coach service at the end of September, 1949. American
announced in late October that a 45 cents a ton-mile service would be instituted in January, 1950.
' Transcript of testimony, Air Freight Rate case, Docket No. X705 et al., pp. 2645-7.
" Carriers in the "need" class included those carriers whose mail pay is in excess of the amount
necessary to pay the costs of the mail service, plus a reasonable return to the carrier. A "service" rate
as distinguished from a "need" rate would presumably be a rate which includes no element of subsidy.
That this is not the case, however, is apparent from the opinions of the Board establishing the present
"service" rate. Dockets Nos. 3309, 3021, 3211, 2849, 3014, March 29, 1948.
"'Dockets Nos. 3309, 3021, 3211, 2849, 3014. Mail rates for these carriers are set on a sliding
scale depending on volume. The range is from 45 cents a ton-mile to 75 cents, but has averaged,
according to CAB records, in the neighborhood of 6o cents.
"Apparently no data are available indicating the average ton-mile rate paid by the public for air
parcel post; however, the carriers are paid for the carriage of parcel post as if for letter mail. Accord-
ingly, air parcel post rates to the public should be in excess of 6o cents a ton-mile, unless the post
office is to suffer substantial losses in this business. The freight carriers urge that legislation be passed
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The founders of the new postwar freight lines, on the other hand, were con-
vinced that rate policies such as these would effectively block the development of
any appreciable volume of commercial air freight. The rates in American's 1944
tariff had reflected such a policy and had resulted in the generation of no appreciable
freight traffic. Accordingly, convinced that economical operations would justify low
rates, the new carriers went into business in early 1946 at rates in the neighborhood
of i8 cents, and soon thereafter reduced them to 14 cents as costs dropped with
increasing volume. These carriers were at that time operating as contract carriers,
since the authority to engage in common carrier operations was not effective until
August 1, I947,' and accordingly filed no tariffs.
The first inkling of what was to be expected from the passenger carriers in the
rate field came in the middle of June, 1946, when American Airlines announced the
organization of its Contract Air Cargo Division.3 There was considerable pub-
licity about the rates that this division would charge' and, apparently in keeping
with American's purpose, the rate level in air freight was immediately and severely
depressed. For instance, for Slick Airways the average rate on the freight business
dropped to IO4 cents a ton-mile, although representatives of that company have
always insisted that they never once undercut one of American's offerings of serv-
ice.45 CACD was not long in the field, but the process of convincing shippers that
freight rates had to be higher than those announced by American was difficult.4
Contract rate levels had been worked back up to between 2% cents and 13 cents
a ton-mile by July of 1947. With the approach of August i, 1947, the effective date
of permission to engage in common carrier operations, Slick Airways filed its first
common carrier tariff, containing rates averaging around 12.75 cents per ton-mile,
rates slightly above the level to which its contract rates had been raised by that time,
and rates at which Slick Airways could operate at a profit as September and October
operations that year proved. Similar tariffs were filed by most of the freight car-
riers who planned to operate under the Noncertificated Cargo Carriers Exemption
Order, Section 292.5, of the Economic Regulations of the Board.
under which carriers would be paid for carrying parcel post at rates prevailing for air freight. This
could have meant air parcel post available to the public at something like 25 cents a ton-mile, and a
profit to the post office.
"a Section 292.5 of the Economic Regulations of the CAB. Under a recent recodification this section
is now known as Part 295.
"aAmerican Airlines, Inc., took the position that it could engage in transcontinental off-route air
freight operation with a large maintenance base at St. Joseph, Missouri, apparently on the theory that
these operations were authorized under Section 4 oI(f) of the Civil Aeronautics Act. "Any air carrier
may make charter trips or perform any other special service, without regard to the points named in
its certificates under regulations prescribed by its authority." 52 STAT. 987 (938), 49 U. S. C.
§4 831(f) (1946).
"'See American Aviation Daily, June 6, 1946, describing CACD publicity: "Tariffs will be based on
volume and frequency and the rate structure is said to be not only the lowest ever promulgated by any
airline, but is generally under the lowest rates quoted by non-scheduled carriers."
"See Slick Airways, Inc.'s Brief to the Board in the Air Freight Rate case, p. 7.
"American Airlines, Inc.'s publicity about is cents a ton-mile rate made the job of selling 12 cent and
12Y2. cent rates extremely difficult.
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As of August I, the passenger carriers put into effect a consolidated tariff known
as the Johnson tariff with rates averaging in the neighborhood of 26 cents a ton-
mile, and going down as low as 14 cents (only for shipments of i6,ooo pounds and
above). Shortly more than a month later, however, American, PCA, TWA, and
United filed tariffs to become effective October 5, 1947, for a list of specific com-
modities, accounting for the bulk of air freight business at that time. These rates
in the new tariffs applied only to points served by the freight carriers and operated
to undercut the existing tariffs of the freight carriers on approximately one-half of
the business.47 Petitions to suspend these tariffs were promptly filed by the freight
carriers and promptly denied by the Board.48 This last step resulted in further cuts
and reductions by American, PCA, and TWA, to become effective late in October.
Petitions to suspend were again filed and were on this occasion granted and the
whole matter of rates in air freight was set down for hearing.49
The freight carriers insisted that the passenger carriers, in spite of substantially
higher costs of operation, were attempting to drive the freight carriers out of the
business by means of a rate war, and they pointed out that even their own tariffs,
filed on August I, had become too low as the result of sharp increases in the price
of gasoline, and some raises in wages in line with the general trend at that time. 0
The passenger carriers, on the other hand, begged for freedom of action with respect
to rates, contending that the industry was still in the development phase and that
the rigidity which any form of rate regulation would impose would seriously ham-
per development.51 They also contended that cut rates could be justified on the
basis of their costs, such costs being computed for this purpose on what the Board
later called the "no cost theory" or on the "additive" or "out-of-pocket cost con-
cept."' 2 The essence of each of these theories was that the air freight service should
be made to bear only that portion of the airlines' costs which could have been
avoided had no freight been carried.53 The Board rejected the contentions of the
passenger carriers and issued a rate order forbidding rate reductions below i6 cents
a ton-mile for the first i,ooo ton-miles, and 13 cents a ton-mile thereafter.54
For the most part, this action effectively brought the rate war to an end. Except
for the fact that the order has served to retard the development of certain perishable
and other items needed to correct the traditional directional unbalance in traffic by
strengthening the backhaul from California to New York and from Texas to New
York, the order has been extremely salutary. It need not have had even this retard-
'" For a discussion of these and the later rate cuts, see the opinion of thd Board in the Air Freight
Rate case, Docket No. X705, et al., decided April 21, 1948, pp. 234 and 235.
'
8 CAB Order, Serial No. E-852 and E-853.
CAB Order, Serial No. E-916.
50 These increases amounted to over $2o,ooo a month for Slick Airways, Inc., alone.
See briefs filed on behalf of the principal passenger carriers in this proceeding.
See the Board's opinion in the Air Freight Rate case, Docket No. I7M5 et al., pp. 8 and 9.
These theories produce some remarkable results. For instance, unit costs increase with volume,
since volume requires additional freight handlers, and, sooner or later, all-cargo planes, which must
be charged, in part at least, to the freight business.
" CAB Order, Serial No. E-i639.
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ing effect, but for the passenger carriers, who, mirabile dictu, after resisting with all
their energy the establishment of minimum rates for the west and southbound haul
for commodities for which there is considerable competition, have reversed their
position and become disciples of rigidity in rate regulation in so far as less-than-
minimum rates for commodities not now moving by air are concerned."
This history of the activities of the passenger carriers in the rate field demon-
strates that the ousting of the freight carriers is the prime objective. Therefore, it
is only natural that other than rate methods of competition have been used as part
of this effort. Extravagant offerings of service, illustrated by the unbelievably low
load factors of the passenger air lines' all-cargo flights,'0 expensive advertising and
propaganda campaigns,5 7 have been used and represent, in the opinion of the freight
carriers, improper forms of competition for air freight, particularly if these offer-
ings of service and advertising and propaganda campaigns are financed not out of
receipts from air freight, but rather by mail subsidy or, perhaps, by revenues from a
suddenly profitable passenger business.
The passenger airlines have resisted every effort to determine what the air freight
service actually costs them. American Airlines went through the whole Air Freight
Rate case in apparent complete ignorance of what its costs per ton-mile were for
" Compare the following statements: The first from American Airlines, Inc.'s brief to the Board in
the Air Freight Rate case, when American was arguing against any rate regulation:
"What the future holds in the way of rate adjustments that may be essential to full utilization of
cargo equipment cannot be foretold at this time. An indication of the type of adjustment that may
prove useful lies in the historical unbalance of traffic movement. The produce grown in California
and Texas may be a partial solution that would bring about a better balanced freight operation, but
such traffic may move only at a lower rate than is necessary to create westbound and southbound
volume. Anyone concerned with the continued development of freight recognizes this, but the non-
certificated carriers ask you to embark upon a minimum rate regulatory program which must inevitably
interfere with such developments."
The second from American's brief in the Directional Rate case, where American is opposing any less-
than-minimum rates designed to produce new traffic:
"The justification for. these departures from the established minimums is that the volume of traffic
moving in those directions is substantially less than the movement in the opposite direction. American
Airlines urges the Board to disapprove the rates requested because they are unrelated to the present
or attainable costs of providing freight service and because they will prevent the sound and economic
development of the freight rate business."
" See American Airlines, Inc.'s Exhibits in the Air Freight case, Docket No. 81o, et al., dated
November, 1948, Parts E and I.
7 See American Aviation Daily of July 6, 1948:
"A two-page advertisement appearing in the July 3 issue of Editor and Publisher, over the signatures
of 'The Established Airlines of the United States,' calls attention to the job the certificated airlines
have done in developing air cargo since the war and outlining their arguments against certification of
the all-cargo airlines seeking to enter the field in competition with them. Petition of the freight lines
is termed 'a threat to the air transportation rights of all the 400 towns and cities now served, and to
the economic stability of the airline systems serving the United States.' The ad also appeared in
'Broadcasting' and in 'Publishers' Auxiliary."'
See also American Aviation Daily, July x6, 1948:
"The Air Transport Association currently is distributing through its Public Relations Advisory Com-
mittee and member airlines 75,000 copies of a pamphlet titled 'Fact and Fiction Regarding the Nation's
Airlines,' in which it presents the case of the 'established airlines' (Le., the certificated lines) in their
fight to block certification of all-cargo carrier applicants in the Air Freight Case."
POSITION OF THE FREIGHT CARRIERS BEoR THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD 27
carrying freight." The Civil Aeronautics Board has from time to time indicated
that accurate and usable information on this subject was imperative if proper regu-
lation in this field was to be had, stating, in the opinion in the Air Freight Rate
case in April, 1948 :
In this connection it is apparent from the record that the development of more reliable
cost data wil become increasingly necessary if the air freight service expands.
During the past year lengthy hearings were held before the so-called Johnson Com-
mittee in the United States Senate on legislation designed to sever subsidy from mail
pay. ° Any such severance would, as a corollary measure, require the separate cost-
ing of the freight service. Desirable as such legislation is, it is the position of the
freight carriers that no new legislation is required to achieve this end, but that the
Civil Aeronautics Board could and should establish a method of allocation for de-
termining the cost of this service. Of course, any method of allocation is subject to
criticism, and the passenger carriers to date have limited their contribution to the
problem by pointing out the fallacies in whatever method is suggested without ever
coming forward with one which they recommend. The freight carriers feel that
the Board should select a method, to be changed or improved when the passenger
carriers come forward with a better one.
The importance of this problem cannot be overstated. It has been contended,
for instance, that in 1948 the passenger carriers lost $i2,oooooo carrying air freight
on which the revenue was considerably less than that figure.6 Of course, this may
or may not be true, depending upon the validity of the allocations of joint cost62
which are used. While it is perfectly true that any calculation of air freight costs
of the passenger carriers depends on a series of arbitrary assumptions and is subject
to criticism on some score or other, it is equally true that if one of the freight car-
riers, such as Slick Airways, were to operate with the load factors which the pas-
senger airlines have experienced and were to add to its operating costs the costs of
the advertising and the contributions to ATA and Air Cargo, Inc., the freight air-
line would soon be in bankruptcy.63
The metaphysics and the ethics of this situation can be debated at length. No
one will come up with a formula for determining to the satisfaction of everybody
and for all purposes just what air freight costs the passenger carriers per ton-mile.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the freight carriers, it is imperative that the
Civil Aeronautics Board announce that freight losses will not be made up out of
" American has since indicated by statement of counsel in the course of the last oral argument of
the Air Freight case that current rates barely cover direct operating costs. Air Freight case, oral argu-
ment, June 13, 1949, Vol. I, p. 1O.
r See opinion Air Freight Rate case, Docket No. 1705, et al., decided April 21, I948, p. 1O.
" The Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
0116 J. AIR L. AND Com. 253, 268 (1949).
' Joint costs are taken to include all costs not directly attributable to a specific service, such as the
president's salary, office rent, flying costs, etc.
"a See Slick Airways, Inc.'s Exhibit SA-3, p. SA-5 in the Air Freight Rate case, Docket No. 1705
et al., dated January 28, 1949.
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mail pay and that the Board select a formula for determining freight costs for the
purpose of enforcing this rule. The freight carriers recognize that some of the
passenger carriers have contended that their freight operations, although operated
at a loss, if the costs thereof are determined on an allocated basis, have none the less
served to reduce the mail pay needs of these carriers because a substantial portion
of these costs have to be incurred anyway. Arguments and calculations of this
latter sort cease to have validity as the air freight operations of the passenger carriers
expand, and particularly as the passenger carriers begin to employ all-cargo flights
for the purpose of handling air freight. In addition, a proper formula for allocating
costs will reflect the much higher cost of the all-cargo service and will give the
passenger carrier the benefit of lesser costs on the freight hauled in passenger planes
and on passenger schedules. As a matter of regulatory policy, dictated by the public
interest in the future development of the air freight industry, and required by simple
fairness, the Board must take, at an early date, some such step to see to it that the
United States Treasury ceases to underwrite one side in the air freight battle. The
Board should further require that the passenger carriers, in their published financial
data, disclose the relationship between freight revenues and freight costs determined
on the basis of the allocation described above.
Possibly it is too much to ask that the passenger carriers be prevented from using
their own capital or revenues from the passenger and express business to pay the
costs of competing for air freight. Certainly, however, the freight carriers have a
right to ask that the United States Treasury not be used to subsidize the fight
against them and, further, that to the extent that capital and other revenues of the
passenger carriers are used to support the competitive effort, the stockholders, the
Board, and the general public be so informed.
If such action had been taken long ago, we would not have witnessed the rate
wars and other destructive battles for the air freight business which have gone on.
The passenger carriers would not have been permitted to fight the Air Freight case
on the basis that the losses which they had incurred and the losses which they
had imposed on the freight carriers were a reason why no new carriers should be
certificated.64
If the second question, "What are proper rules of the game," can be answered
by such action, then there is every reason to believe that the four newly certificated
freight carriers will grow and prosper, and that with their growth the air freight
industry will enjoy a rapid and efficient advance toward the one billion ton-mile
potential which has been predicted for it.
"4 This argument was made with considerable force and no little effect. See, for instance, the dis-
senting opinion of Member Jones, who relies heavily on freight carrier losses as a reason why they
should not be certificated.
